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## ISRAEL NEWS

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### Commentary...

#### Mich. AG Nessel To Jews: Sacrifice Your Safety for 'Humanity'

By Morton A. Klein

Michigan Attorney-General Dana Nessel is telling Jews something deeply disturbing: we may need to sacrifice our own safety and even our own future for "humanity."

That is a terrible message. It is also far outside the Jewish tradition she claims to be invoking.

Speaking to Jewish Democrats on August 30, Nessel said, "It is perhaps up to us now to follow in [Queen Esther's] path and sacrifice the comfort, safety, and security and even the very future of our own people in exchange for the opportunity to save the rest of humanity."

But Nessel is not speaking for Jewish history when she says this. She is a radical outlier using Queen Esther to make an argument that turns Esther's story upside down.

Esther did not sacrifice the Jewish people to save everyone else. She risked herself to save the Jews of Persia.

Nessel went even further, asking, "What good is defending the historic homeland of our ancestors and demanding that candidates acknowledge its right to exist if the planet upon which it rests is no longer inhabitable?"

Why should Jews have to choose? Jewish safety and concern for humanity are not opposites. Protecting Jews is not selfish. Protecting Israel is not selfish. And Jewish lives are not bargaining chips that can be sacrificed for some larger cause.

Nessel also accused Republicans of supporting "selfishness" that is supposedly a "direct abdication of our responsibilities as Jews." But there is nothing selfish about Jews wanting to stay alive.

Jewish law makes this clear: if attackers demand that a group hand over one innocent person or everyone will be killed, that person cannot simply be handed over. Every human life has value. We do not decide that one innocent person can be sacrificed because someone claims it will save a larger number.

Nessel's argument is also based on a false choice. Protecting Jews and Israel does not mean turning our backs on humanity.

The Jewish people have spent generations helping humanity. Jewish scientists Jonas Salk and Dr. Albert Sabin developed polio vaccines that reduced polio by 99%. Jewish public health scientist Dr. Israel Kligler helped lead the first successful campaign to eliminate malaria.

Israeli Jews pioneered drip irrigation, desalination, and wastewater recycling. Jews make up less than 0.2% of the world's population yet have received 26% of Nobel Prizes in Medicine.

When polio appeared in Gaza in 2024-2025, Israel facilitated pauses in its fight against Hamas so more than 600,000 Gazan children could receive polio vaccinations.

And when Jews were falsely blamed for the Black Death, murdering Jews did nothing to stop the plague. More than 500 years later, Jewish scientist Waldemar Mordecai Haffkine developed the first vaccine for the bubonic plague.

So who is really helping humanity? The answer is not the people who murder Jews. And it certainly should not be Jews who are told to stand aside while their own safety is put at risk.

That brings us to Abdul Mohamed El-Sayed.

To Nessel's credit, she has resisted the rush by too many Democratic leaders to endorse El-Sayed. She has also warned that politicians who threaten Israel's existence as a Jewish state can put Jews in the Diaspora at greater risk.

She is right about that.

But then Nessel tells Jews that they may need to sacrifice their own safety and even their future for "humanity." That makes no sense.

El-Sayed's record shows exactly why Jewish safety matters.

He repeatedly dodges the simple question of whether Israel has a

right to exist while saying he would be happy to discuss a Palestinian right to exist. He falsely accuses Israel of genocide and apartheid. He has pledged to follow Sharia law in everything he does.

He has campaigned alongside extremist, open Jew-hater, and America-hater Hasan Piker, who said America deserved 9/11 and that the October 7 mass rapes of Jewish women and children did not matter.

El-Sayed also called for reducing police funding.

Most disturbing, El-Sayed justified the vehicle-ramming terror attack on a Michigan synagogue preschool that endangered 140 Jewish toddlers and teachers and injured a security guard. The attacker was a Lebanese-American Muslim tied to Hezbollah.

El-Sayed responded, "hurt people hurt people" and "violence begets violence." That is not an excuse for terrorism against Jews.

His later statement that "what I was trying to say is that there is a broader question of the responsibility" did not change what he had said. It was another attempt to justify Muslim terrorism against Jews.

Nessel should understand what is at stake.

Jewish safety is not some selfish side issue. It is not something Jews should be ashamed to defend. And Jews should never be told that protecting ourselves makes us enemies of humanity.

We do not need to prove that Jews have invented enough medicines, saved enough lives, or helped enough people to deserve safety. Jews deserve safety because Jews are human beings.

Nessel should retract her dangerous message that Jews may need to sacrifice their own safety and future for the rest of humanity. And she should stop pretending that this is what Jewish history teaches.

It is not. Queen Esther risked her life to save her people. Michigan Attorney-General Dana Nessel told Jews to sacrifice themselves and their homeland to feed the antisemites hijacking her political party. (Jerusalem Post Sep 16)

## גמר חתימה טובה

#### Jewish Americans are the Test; Canada is the Preview

By Craig Considine and Sydney Rodman

The war waged in the West by Islamic extremists is won in the institutions before it's won on the battlefield. Their method has a modern name: entryism. It involves embedding an ideology in campuses, charities and political parties so the battle is already half over before most people notice.

In the West, they keep choosing the same target: Jews.

Canada is a prime example of how this method plays out. A 2026 Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) analysis explored how Muslim Brotherhood-aligned networks are embedded in Canadian society. Even seemingly benign organizations like charities appear, in certain cases, to be a Trojan horse for Islamism. For example, the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) has come under scrutiny after a Canada Revenue Agency audit indicated MAC had links to the Muslim Brotherhood.

On the electoral side, the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC) and allied groups ran a 2025 "Vote Palestine" campaign that secured endorsements from hundreds of candidates across four parties. On campus, the ISGAP report notes, Qatar-linked funding of Canadian universities has surged.

The battlefield dynamics are not only about charities, grants and foreign influence. It's about a civic climate in which Jewish presence is treated as a primary problem.

These Brotherhood-aligned groups are increasingly difficult to scrutinize because any inquiry is quickly branded Islamophobia. Those rules do not protect moderate Muslims. In reality, they protect their political rivals—the Islamist networks that claim to speak in their name. Canadians who name the networks are called "bigots." Jewish safety becomes a footnote to someone else's "Islamophobia."

That is how entryism works. Criticism of the network is rewritten as bigotry.

Joe Adam George, the Middle East Forum's Canada researcher on Islamist threats, interviewed for this article, elaborated on the ISGAP file's findings: "Islamist groups in Canada have repeatedly been caught exploiting their charitable status to covertly pursue

activities beyond their mandate. Yet they often evade accountability by accusing investigators and security agencies of anti-Muslim bias, and, worse, continue to receive government patronage despite past misconduct."

This "nonprofit" cover, George said, is key to the broader Islamist political strategy: Governments fund them to deliver "Islamophobia" and "anti-Palestinian racism" training in schools; in return, politicians aligned with their agenda are assured of the influential Muslim vote to "help them win or stay in power."

That is the preview. George warns, "The United States must be concerned about Canada's blind backing of these Islamist groups."

The United States already has similar Islamist architecture under different names: the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in civic life; the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) on university campuses; and a Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) movement that treats "Palestine" as the moral test and Israel as the problem.

The script for this network is a leaked 1991 Muslim Brotherhood strategic memo. It is a plan to capture American institutions and use coalitions to reshape public opinion in the spirit of Antonio Gramsci, the 20th-century Italian communist. His "war of position" concept aimed to embed a worldview in the schools, media and political parties that manufacture everyday assumptions without firing a shot on a battlefield.

The West observed his strategy in real time following Oct. 7, 2023, when floods of protests treated Jews and Jewish sites as targets. The effect was to strip Jews of their safety and free speech. "Entryism" is the campaign's name, "Palestine" is its banner, and "institutional capture" is its strategy.

The Canadian strategy has found its way onto the American election ballot. Recent Democratic Party primaries and the last New York City mayoral election show how far an Islamist-progressive package can travel under social democratic branding.

For example, New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani has floated using his position to illegally arrest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu if he sets foot in Manhattan to attend the annual U.N. General Assembly. On his first day in office, Mamdani focused on redefining antisemitism to limit its definition's scope and lifted restrictions on boycotting Israel. Even before taking office, he refused to sign a measure condemning the Holocaust. Two years after his father spoke at the first SJP conference, Mamdani founded an SJP chapter at Bowdoin College in Maine to further marginalize Jews.

These are not isolated campaign quirks. They are the Canadian pattern arriving in American politics. In accordance with the plan, Islamist networks treat Jewish safety as something to rewrite.

Michigan senatorial nominee Dr. Abdul El-Sayed ran on cutting military aid to Israel. After a truck-ramming attack at Temple Israel in Michigan, El-Sayed condemned the violence, then added that "hurt people hurt people," a justification that turns Jewish victims into an afterthought. Reporting has tied his campaign to CAIR.

If this Islamist strategy can win primaries and Gracie Mansion, then American values are no longer winning. If entryism continues to choose Jews as its ultimate target, the test for the United States is whether this discrimination is named early enough to be stopped.

Fighting political entryism is only half the battle. The other half is what can and cannot be said. A leaked Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) memo told staff, "Do not refer to the Sept. 11 attacks as terrorist attacks." A 2023 guidance likewise told journalists not to call Hamas terrorists "terrorists." Following a backlash, the CBC adjusted the 9/11 rule. The lesson, however, was clear: Entryism wins when institutions police vocabulary. The test for the United States is whether Jewish Americans remain speakers in the public realm or are ostracized by the new vocabulary.

Melanie Bennet, a Juno News investigative reporter, told the authors of this article that Islamist groups are among the "sacred cows in the culture of Canada's political correctness." In May 2026, she was in the hall at the MAC convention in Toronto, where a youth session produced a "Jew-free" word cloud, and speakers talked of political infiltration. Her reporting was attacked as a smear, but she has kept publishing.

"Islamophobia," Bennet said, "is blasphemy through the back door." Any criticism of Islamic groups, however radical their ties, is now, in her account, impossible in Canada without being "branded as an Islamophobe."

She added, "In Canada, we do not have that free-speech culture like the United States does."

Muslim Brotherhood entryism risks gradually pushing America over the deep end, where it may begin sinking to the depths of Brotherhood-infiltrated Canadian society. To swim, not sink, America needs to begin rooting out Brotherhood influence from its institutions. (JNS Sep 16)

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## **The Truth Behind the Film "Naza" (Collateral Damage)**

By Sarit Zehavi

The creators of the recent documentary dealing with the topic of "Naza" (a Hebrew military acronym for Nezek Agavi - collateral damage) did not have to work too hard to discover the truth.

They could have simply interviewed me. I would have stood in front of the camera, without hiding my identity, on the roof of my house located nine kilometers from Lebanon, after we absorbed endless barrages of rockets here, and explained the reality on the ground to them.

A little less than 20 years ago, I was one of the founders of the field within the IDF that deals with warning populations on the other side of enemy lines and preserving the lives of their civilians.

We built the work processes that define how to call upon the population to evacuate, and how to track that evacuation. I was personally involved in formulating the target approval processes and operational discussions.

If they had spoken with me, I would have explained to them that the chart shown at the beginning of the film is not a chart for conducting killings, but rather a planning chart for a target identified as being used by Hamas.

Its purpose is to determine whether to strike a target at all, who in the command echelon is authorized to approve it, with what munitions, and under what conditions. In stark contrast to what is stated in the film, when the words "Naza 500 - collateral damage estimated at 500" appear in the approval process, the meaning is that action must be taken to reduce the collateral damage.

There are a variety of ways to do this, such as a call for evacuation, precision munitions, or canceling the strike entirely (what is known as an unapproved target). Noting the collateral damage on the target sheet does not signify an intention to carry out the killing of civilians or a "genocide"; it is intended, first and foremost, to prevent it.

Our enemies, both Hamas and Hezbollah, deliberately plant their rockets and headquarters in the heart of the civilian population, in tunnels under Beirut or in high-rise residential buildings in southern Lebanon. Hamas in Gaza did the same, using children as human shields. They do this based on the working assumption that if Israel strikes without warning, 500 civilians will be killed. That is exactly their goal. But Israel chooses differently: there are at least hundreds of soldiers and officers in the IDF whose entire role is the protection of the enemy's population. That is what they think about when they wake up in the morning. This is what the IDF pays them a salary for.

If the editors of the film had wanted to conduct serious research, they could have interviewed former (like me) and present IDF soldiers and officers, who would tell them the truth about collateral damage. But they chose not to do so.

The promo for the film claims that the IDF "never checks the number of civilians killed."

The truth is that checking the exact number of casualties in enemy territory in real-time is a complex and nearly impossible task. This is exactly why the collateral damage assessment process was created in advance, to consider the size of the structure and the routine number of civilians in its vicinity.

The IDF has invested and continues to invest massive resources - intelligence personnel, legal experts, operational personnel from the air and ground forces, and technological experts - to develop command and control systems that accurately reflect where civilians are present and where they are not. I was personally involved in developing these tools during my military service in the Northern Command and during my subsequent reserve service.

From my experience, I can testify that a whole world of intelligence stands behind this effort. In the Intelligence Directorate, there are several desks whose exclusive role is tracking the evacuation percentages of the population from rural and urban areas after the IDF has published warnings. If a high percentage of the

population has evacuated following the warnings, the collateral damage assessment drops, and only then is a strike on the terror infrastructure permitted.

But unfortunately, it is precisely the IDF's efforts to preserve the lives of the enemy's population, namely, the evacuation warnings and tracking of the evacuation status, that have been interpreted as "ethnic cleansing" in international media, while ignoring the scope of the terror infrastructure exposed inside and beneath the villages in both Lebanon and Gaza, in every house.

I have been asked several times by reporters why we evacuate such extensive areas. Here is my answer: when Hamas or Hezbollah dig a tunnel network under villages, it is impossible to destroy them without harming the dozens of houses above them. A targeted evacuation of a specific house during a tunnel explosion will result in harm to civilians.

Despite the extensive intelligence efforts invested to ensure that the target is clear of civilians, this is a world where uncertainty is exceedingly high. Intelligence will always be partial and insufficient. There have been many recorded cases where there was no information about the presence of civilians in the terror infrastructure or near the terrorist, and they were killed as a result. This grim outcome cannot erase the fact that efforts to prevent collateral damage are indeed made.

Decision-making on the battlefield is complex, the dilemmas are immense, and the nature of the battlefield is that mistakes are sometimes made. But the difference between us and the enemy is enormous. In contrast to the radical Islamic ideology of Hamas and Hezbollah, who publicly declare that their goal is to kill Israeli civilians (and act accordingly), we state clearly that we have no intention whatsoever of killing civilians in enemy territory, and we even allow the entry of humanitarian aid into the combat zone, despite the fact that this harms our operational achievement in the fight against terrorism.

As parents of soldiers, this is how we educate our children - civilians are not a target. And these children grow up to become the soldiers and officers who serve in the IDF.

It is unfortunate that the filmmakers chose not to conduct real research. Contrary to what is required by journalistic ethics, they even refrained from sending the report to the IDF for comment, so it is impossible to know what roles the interviewees held within the system, and whether their point of view, assuming it is authentic, is even relevant to understanding the chain of approvals and actions taken prior to striking a target.

The filmmakers preferred to tell a story from a very narrow angle, to interview anonymous sources whose level of involvement, rank, and understanding of the process is unclear, and to completely ignore the experts who built these systems with one goal: preserving human life. There are such experts. I was one of them. (Alma Centre Sep 16)  
*The writer is the founder and president of Alma Research and Education Center.*

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### **The October 7 Failure was Strategic, Military and Tactical, but it was not Betrayal** By Guy Hazut|

Three years after October 7, Israel is still struggling to answer the simplest and hardest question of all: How did this happen to us? In the absence of a state commission of inquiry capable of producing an agreed factual account, the unanswered questions have become fertile ground for theories about betrayal from within and claims that information was deliberately concealed from the political leadership. But no conspiracy is needed to understand the disaster. What is required is an unflinching look at the strategic, systemic and tactical failures that accumulated over years, until they all collapsed together in a single morning.

Success has many fathers; failure, as the saying goes, is an orphan. But the October 7 disaster is not an orphan when it comes to responsibility. It was the result of a series of failures that developed simultaneously on three levels: the strategic-political level, the senior military-command level and the tactical level on the ground in the Gaza Division.

The scale of the failure, the depth of the collapse, Hamas' ability to surprise and overwhelm the IDF's defensive system in southern Israel, and the many questions that have remained unanswered ever since have created fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Chief among them is the claim that senior security officials knew about the attack,

concealed the information and deliberately refrained from preventing it. Alongside it is the claim that the military and Shin Bet excluded the prime minister and did not bother to update him during the night before the attack.

When the public has no agreed answers, it begins searching for others. And as long as no state commission of inquiry is established to present the public with a complete, authoritative factual picture, such theories will continue to gain strength. This is not merely an argument about the past. When a large segment of the public stops believing state institutions and the security establishment and begins to believe that senior officials conspired against it, the cohesion on which Israeli society depends is damaged.

Next month will mark three years since the Hamas attack on October 7 and the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. Despite all the time that has passed, the Israeli public still has no complete, agreed answer to one question: How the hell did this happen to us?

Like many others, Giora Eiland tries to grapple with that question in his excellent recently published book. He opens it by quoting Avigdor Kahalani: "There are three things beyond my understanding: the human body, the universe and October 7." That sentence captures the feeling of many Israelis.

How did Hamas, a terrorist organization in Gaza, manage to surprise and overpower the strongest military in the Middle East for hours? How, 50 years after the Yom Kippur War, did it manage to execute a deception plan and surprise Israel's intelligence and early-warning systems? Where was the IDF during the hours in which residents of southern Israel were being massacred and abducted? And what was done, and above all what was not done, with the warning signs that appeared during the night before the attack?

As more time passes since that black Saturday, and certainly as the political system enters an election period, those question marks are not disappearing. On the contrary, they are becoming weapons in the battle over responsibility for the disaster.

According to a recently published survey, around 40% of Israelis believe some version of the "betrayal from within" theory, the claim that senior security officials knew about the attack and refrained from stopping it in order to bring down the right-wing government. That figure should trouble every Israeli, regardless of political position. Human beings find it difficult to live with uncertainty for long. We want clear explanations, causes and responsibility. In other words, we want exclamation marks instead of question marks. But when, nearly three years after the event, no agreed state body has presented the public with the complete picture, a vacuum is created. And in that vacuum, alternative versions, rumors and conspiracy theories flourish.

When political and other actors who have an interest in promoting a particular interpretation of events are added to the mix, it is hardly surprising that such theories gain traction. You cannot fight a conspiracy theory with a counter-conspiracy theory. The way to confront it is through facts, by explaining how the system actually works and determining the role each level played in the failure.

Alongside the betrayal theory, another claim has recently gained prominence, particularly among figures in the political leadership: During the night of October 6, the heads of the security establishment received unusual intelligence from Gaza but chose not to wake or update the prime minister. There is no question that determining who knew what, when they knew it and why they did not act differently requires a thorough investigation. But to examine that claim, one first has to understand how a military and security system operates in real time.

Throughout my years as a senior commander, I would make one very simple point clear to my people in our initial conversations: what they should wake me up for in the middle of the night. When my subordinates chose not to wake me and it later became clear that they had made the wrong call, I did not limit my criticism to them. I also examined myself. Had I clearly defined what I wanted to know and when?

A commander cannot expect his subordinates to read his mind. If particular intelligence or an operational event requires immediate notification in his view, he has to establish that expectation in advance.

Nights in which unusual intelligence emerged and late-night consultations were held were not exceptional in the IDF and the security establishment during the years before October 7. I personally

know of dozens of such cases. Unusual intelligence emerges in a particular command. The commanding general asks to bring the chief of staff into a consultation. The head of the Operations Directorate and the head of Military Intelligence will generally join, and sometimes other senior officers as well, such as the Air Force commander or head of the Planning Directorate. A consultation takes place, and at its conclusion the chief of staff decides how to proceed and issues instructions. That is precisely the role of the senior military command.

If a prime minister believes that he should be updated in real time about every such event, including during the night, he must make that clear to the military leadership. This principle has nothing to do with one particular prime minister. It is a basic management principle governing the relationship between the political and military levels.

For years, there was no established procedure requiring the prime minister to participate in every nighttime operational or intelligence consultation. There is logic to that. The prime minister's central responsibility is to manage national security at the strategic level, not to replace the chief of staff, regional commanders or division commanders in making operational and tactical decisions.

None of this absolves anyone of responsibility for what happened that night. Quite the opposite. A commission of inquiry must determine exactly what information each person possessed, how it was analyzed, what decisions were made and why. But the mere fact that a nighttime consultation took place without the prime minister does not, in itself, prove that he was deliberately excluded, and it certainly does not prove betrayal.

Managing war is among the most complex human endeavors. The theoretical knowledge surrounding warfare has accumulated over thousands of years, but the greatest difficulty is not simply knowing that knowledge. It is applying it under pressure, uncertainty, danger and incomplete information. There is a reason it is called the "art of war."

That art operates simultaneously on three levels: the strategic level, where the political leadership defines the overarching objectives and directive; the operational level, where senior military commanders translate those objectives into a plan of action; and the tactical level, where forces on the ground determine how that plan will be implemented. One reason the October 7 failure was so severe is that it did not occur at only one level. It developed at all three, and at the decisive moment all three collapsed together.

*The strategic-political failure:* For years, the Israeli government pursued a policy aimed at deepening the division between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In 2018, when the Palestinian Authority stopped paying salaries to employees in Gaza and Hamas found itself under pressure, Israel faced demands to prevent further deterioration and escalation. Fearing escalation, Israel turned to Qatar and allowed money to flow into the Strip. The policy was intended to stabilize the situation in the short term. In practice, it also helped sustain Hamas rule and its military buildup for war against Israel.

At the same time, substantial offensive military capabilities were developing for more than a decade in both Gaza and Lebanon. Hezbollah and Hamas built large commando forces designed to shift within hours from routine operations to attacks against communities in northern and southern Israel. This reality contradicted fundamental principles of Israel's security doctrine, yet the political leadership refrained from directing the senior military command to launch a pre-emptive war to remove the threat.

*The systemic-military failure:* The senior military command operated for years within that policy but did not challenge it to the degree required. Contrary to military doctrine, a significant part of the defensive deployment along Israel's southern and northern borders relied on relatively limited forces and on the assumption that intelligence would identify a change in enemy intentions and provide sufficient warning.

Put simply, instead of building a defense capable of holding even if intelligence was wrong, the system became deeply dependent on warning. That was a systemic vulnerability. When the assumption about Hamas' intentions collapsed and intelligence failed to provide the necessary warning, it became clear that the defensive system itself had not been built to withstand Hamas' offensive capabilities on its own.

*The tactical failure:* The tactical level, the forces of the Gaza Division responsible for protecting the border communities, was also captive to the same conception. The forces did not believe Hamas was capable of, or intended to carry out, an attack on the scale that ultimately took

place. They relied on the same assessment of Hamas' intentions accepted by the levels above them. But even when an intelligence assessment is wrong, a military force must be prepared for the possibility that the enemy will surprise it.

On October 7, deep failures were exposed in the operational culture, readiness and alertness of some forces. At the decisive moment, systems that were supposed to defend the border and its communities were not sufficiently prepared for their mission.

Hamas identified the distortion at all three levels. This is evident from the "Jericho Wall" document, Hamas' operational plan, and from enemy documents captured during the war. When the strategic, operational and tactical levels all acted in ways fundamentally contrary to what was required of them, everything collapsed like a house of cards at 6:29 a.m.

October 7 was first and foremost a military failure. Even under a mistaken political and strategic conception, the IDF, through the Gaza Division, the Air Force and Military Intelligence, was obligated to fulfill its most basic purpose and defend the residents of the border communities. But there is still an enormous gulf between catastrophic professional failure and accusing the heads of the security establishment of betrayal.

Anyone deeply familiar with the flow of intelligence inside Israel's security establishment knows that the person with the most complete picture of what is happening in Gaza is the Gaza Division intelligence officer, just as the Galilee Division intelligence officer is the leading expert on Lebanon. Intelligence from all the relevant agencies, including Unit 8200, Shin Bet and Mossad, flows to his desk.

On October 7, the Gaza Division intelligence officer was an officer who came from the religious Zionist community and was also the son of one of the prime minister's closest security advisers. That intelligence officer, the IDF's leading expert on the Gaza arena, shared the assessment of the Southern Command intelligence officer that night: the warning signs did not warrant excessive alarm and did not indicate an anomaly requiring preparations for war.

Had that officer thought differently that night, no one in the security establishment could have, or would have tried to, "silence" him. Quite the opposite. Everyone would have understood that if the senior expert on the arena was alarmed, the entire system needed to be alarmed.

The problem that night was not that someone knew with certainty and concealed it. The far more serious problem was that an entire system saw the signs but interpreted them through a conception that had become too deeply embedded at every level.

October 7 may remain an event that many Israelis will struggle for years to comprehend. That is the nature of a failure on this scale. The gap between the power of the State of Israel and what happened during those hours is so enormous that it can sometimes seem easier to believe somebody wanted it to happen than to accept that large, professional and experienced systems can fail so completely.

But military history shows that they can. The collapse of the Maginot Line and the Atlantic Wall during World War II, Pearl Harbor, the conception that led to Israel's collapse at the outset of the Yom Kippur War, and 9/11 are only some of the examples. No betrayal is required to explain October 7.

There is more than enough already: a flawed political conception, a policy that was not adjusted in time, intelligence that misread the enemy, excessive dependence on early warning, defensive systems that did not match the threat, inadequate readiness, and failures in command and response.

These are difficult explanations. In some ways, they are even harder than a conspiracy theory because they force us to recognize that the failure was not the act of one person or a secret group. It was the product of an entire system.

But responsibility must be based on facts. As long as no state commission of inquiry is established to examine the political leadership, the IDF, the intelligence community and the decision-making process, and to present the public with a single, authoritative and comprehensive factual account, a vacuum will remain.

And inside that vacuum, conspiracy theories will continue to flourish. (Ynet Sep 7)

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