



ISRAEL NEWS

*A collection of the week's news from Israel
From the Bet El Twinning / Israel Action Committee of
Beth Avraham Yoseph of Toronto Congregation*

Commentary...

Israel was being restrained before Hamas was Disarmed

By Eyal Dror

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected the 15-point Gaza roadmap on Sunday, insisting that Israel would not withdraw from territory it controls before Hamas is genuinely disarmed.

At the core of his disagreement with U.S. President Donald Trump's plan is sequencing—that is, the question of whether Israel ought to relinquish military leverage and freedom of action while Hamas still retains weapons, tunnels and coercive power.

Israel has good reason to refuse to withdraw, at least for the moment. Recently, I warned that deploying an International Stabilization Force before Hamas is substantially disarmed could end up stabilizing Hamas rather than the Gaza Strip. My concern was that, once an international mechanism was operating inside Gaza, every Israeli action would be portrayed as a threat to the diplomatic process.

Western diplomacy too often makes the same strategic error: It confuses the appearance of a process with a change in reality.

This was demonstrated by events preceding Israel's rejection of the roadmap. Hamas had not yet taken a single verified step toward disarmament, yet the pressure on Israel was already producing operational constraints. This risked turning the promise of demilitarization into a substitute for demilitarization itself.

Even before Netanyahu's public rejection on Aug. 9, the operational consequences of this pressure were becoming clear. According to Israeli media reports, the Israel Defense Forces had significantly tightened its rules for targeted killings in Gaza. Israel has not stopped striking in Gaza, particularly in response to immediate threats. But the threshold for proactive action had reportedly changed: Targeted killings that were once authorized by the Southern Command chief or a division commander now required the personal approval of the IDF chief of staff.

The issue is not whether the chief of staff should approve a particular strike. Nor is every decision to exercise restraint necessarily mistaken. Military prudence and political timing are legitimate considerations. The real issue is sequence.

This policy change followed reports that Nickolay Mladenov, the Board of Peace official overseeing Gaza's postwar transition, pressed Israel to halt its strikes as negotiations over Hamas's supposed disarmament move forward. Egypt, Qatar and Turkey have simultaneously called on the international community to increase pressure on Israel.

The emerging asymmetry could not have been clearer: Hamas's obligations were deferred, gradual, conditional and open to interpretation. Israel's restraint was expected to be immediate, visible and enforceable. Hamas spoke of drafts, stages, guarantees and prior Israeli obligations. Its representatives have said that no disarmament will begin before an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Questions remained over whether weapons would be destroyed, transferred or merely stored, as well as who would control them.

Israel's restraint was expected to be immediate, visible and enforceable.

Meanwhile, Jerusalem was expected to stop acting now. That is how diplomatic traps are built—not through one dramatic concession, but through an accumulation of temporary restrictions, each presented as necessary to protect the process.

It works like this: Israel is asked to reduce its operations as a gesture of good faith. Then a targeted strike becomes a threat to negotiations. Later, intelligence-driven action is condemned as a violation of the agreement. Eventually, Israel's freedom to act is no

longer treated as an inherent right of self-defence, but as an exceptional measure requiring international justification.

Western diplomacy too often makes the same strategic error: It confuses the appearance of a process with a change in

reality. Its diplomats measure progress by declarations, committees, timelines, conferences and carefully choreographed announcements. Hamas measures progress differently. It asks whether it still has weapons, commanders, tunnels, money, loyal operatives and the power to frighten its opponents.

Cocktails and press conferences can manufacture momentum. They cannot manufacture disarmament. A communiqué may declare that Gaza is moving toward civilian governance. A conference may celebrate a new roadmap. A multinational force may pose for photographs beneath the flags of participating nations. But if Hamas retains the ability to kill rivals, threaten civilians, hide weapons and wait for international pressure to restrain Israel, then it remains the real power in Gaza.

The West sees a diplomatic process. Hamas sees time, protection and survival. For a terrorist organization, survival itself is victory. Hamas does not need to defeat Israel militarily. It needs to remain standing long enough for others to prevent Israel from finishing the job.

Every day that Hamas keeps its weapons while Israel's hands are tied reinforces the organization's central message to the people of Gaza and to the entire region: Violence works. Patience works. International pressure will eventually restrict Israel more effectively than any agreement restricts Hamas.

Israel should support a genuine mechanism for Gaza's demilitarization and civilian reconstruction. But every concession must be linked to a verified, measurable and irreversible step. Not another declaration or promise. Not another roadmap. There must be a tunnel demolished, a weapons depot dismantled, a commander removed from power. A policing mechanism freed from Hamas coercion.

The agreement must also state clearly that Israel retains the right to act when Hamas violates its obligations or when an international force proves unwilling or unable to enforce them. An International Stabilization Force cannot become an international veto over Israeli self-defence.

A process that places new restraints on Israeli action while giving Hamas time to conceal its weapons is not demilitarization. It is managed immunity.

Thus, a genuine stabilization process must begin by reducing the power of Hamas, not by reducing Israel's ability to confront it. Otherwise, the international community will not stabilize Gaza. It will stabilize the organization that made Gaza impossible to stabilize in the first place. (JNS Aug 12)

The Gaza Bait and Switch: What Trump's Deal Changed and Why Israel was Right to Reject it

By Pesach Wolicki

Israel has rejected US President Donald Trump's 15-point Gaza plan, Prime Minister Netanyahu had told his cabinet on Sunday. He wasn't vague about why. "The IDF," he said, "will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is disarmed."

That sentence exposes exactly what was wrong with Trump's road map all along. The bait-and-switch of the suggested 15-point road map for the second phase of Trump's Gaza peace plan lies in the fact that it does not explicitly reject the 20-point plan Israel signed onto last fall.

Rather, its deception lies in the plan walking back key points while sounding as if it is implementing them.

The most noteworthy change is in the sequencing. The road map takes commitments that were sequential – Hamas had to do X before Israel would do Y – and turns them into parallel or reverse processes.

Given that nothing is crossed out, it still looks like implementation. But in an agreement like this, the order in which the process is executed is part of the agreement. Reverse the order, and you have reversed the deal, even while every clause appears intact. Netanyahu's rejection is, in effect, a rejection of that reversal.

Start with the disarmament and removal of Hamas – the whole point of this process. Point 13 of the original plan was unambiguous: Hamas's infrastructure would be "destroyed and not rebuilt" with weapons "permanently beyond use."

Article 8 of the road map uses different language – weapons are to be "decommissioned and stored" only after the incoming National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) has taken charge and the International Stabilization Force (ISF) is deployed.

"Destroyed" became "stored," and the new governing body now precedes Hamas's disarmament rather than following it. Article 9 goes a step further, subjecting "personal weapons" belonging to Gazan citizens to Palestinian law under the NCAG. Personal weapons? Palestinian law?

The ISF's role may be the single most consequential change. Originally, it was "the long-term internal security solution," working alongside Israel. But Article 12 of the road map redefines its job as separating Israeli forces from NCAG-controlled areas and explicitly bars it from any policing role.

Internal security, however, now falls entirely to a Palestinian police force; Israel has no role in vetting this force.

The ISF hasn't been diminished – it has been redefined. What was originally meant to be a security partner now serves as a buffer standing between Israel and the Gaza population centers instead.

This raises a question that the road map never answers: If the ISF isn't the internal security solution, who actually takes Hamas's weapons away?

What's emerging instead is a Palestinian Authority security force under a new acronym. A former PA bureaucrat leads the NCAG, which is shaping up to be "PA 2.0." Notably, the original plan demanded comprehensive reform by the PA before it would play any role in Gaza.

Let's be clear about what this adds up to. While Trump's original 20-point plan aspired to a Gaza free of Hamas, this road map eventuates in its preservation.

Consider Article 10: "Weapons of the militias shall be decommissioned and stored under NCAG authority ... Members of those militias shall not be integrated into the security and police services."

The militias in question are the courageous anti-Hamas groups that have formed in Gaza – some working with the IDF, fighting to free Gaza from Hamas, and seeking peaceful coexistence with Israel. The road map categorically excludes them from the future police force.

This begs the question: If the goal is a post-Hamas Gaza, and police officers are to be vetted, what vetting standard would these anti-Hamas militias fail? These militias are the closest thing Gaza has to a homegrown constituency for coexistence, and they are the one group locked out of building what replaces Hamas.

The issue of Palestinian statehood follows the same pattern. In the 20-point plan, it appears only at the end, as a distant aspiration contingent on real PA reform and progress toward transforming Gaza's society. In the road map, a Palestinian state is introduced in Article 1 as a core aim, and it reappears in Article 8, tied to the weapons process – but with no mention of PA reform at all.

Netanyahu addressed this too on Sunday, saying that "as long as I am prime minister, there will be no Palestinian state." That is the correct answer to a document that tried to smuggle statehood in through the front door while dropping the one safeguard – PA reform – that made the idea conditional in the first place.

And the body meant to enforce all of this, the International Verification Committee, includes Qatar and Turkey among its guarantors – two governments with long records of financing and hosting Hamas's leadership. They have now been positioned to judge whether Hamas is keeping its word.

Nickolay Mladenov, the head of the Board of Peace, said the quiet part out loud when he wrote that Israeli withdrawal "must move in

lock step with decommissioning" weapons. That phrase captures precisely the sequencing shift Netanyahu just refused to accept.

This is not a new story. It is the oldest story in Israel's diplomatic history. From the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty to the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, nearly every agreement Israel has signed has followed the same arc: the other side ignores its written obligations, and Israel is expected to accept less than was promised.

For example, the Oslo Accords required the PA to educate its population toward peaceful coexistence. That clause was abandoned without consequence, and two generations of Palestinians were raised on a curriculum that teaches murdering Israelis is the highest act of patriotism.

This road map is repeating that pattern in real time, clause by clause. Netanyahu's rejection is the first sign that, in a post-October 7 world, Israel may finally be prepared to insist that all agreements be implemented exactly as written. Netanyahu must hold his ground and declare that the decades of bait-and-switch games are over.

(Jerusalem Post Aug 11)

Oman Is Iran's Partner in Piracy By Shay Khatiri

According to Iranian media, an agreement between Iran and Oman over the Strait of Hormuz is just days, if not hours, away. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei stated on August 5, 2026, that "our country's relevant authorities are considering its several dimensions—technical, legal, security, and ecological." Environmental fees are Iran's euphemism for tolls. Baghaei also cautioned that an agreement with Oman alone will not secure navigation through the Strait, and there remain "other factors that make [things] unsafe," such as a naval blockade against Iran and "other invasive and threatening actions" by the United States.

Nour News, close with the Supreme National Security Council, reiterated Baghaei's point in an editorial. It argued that the agreement with Oman concerns only operating the waterway and will not alone result in a reopening of the Strait. Unmolested transit through the Strait will depend on factors such as unfreezing Iran's financial assets, enforcing a complete ceasefire in Lebanon, according to the June 2026 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran, and the fulfillment of the commitments the United States made in the Islamabad agreement. "A technical agreement is a necessary condition for directing the traffic, but it is not a sufficient condition for reopening the Strait," the editorial declared.

In a different article, Nour News cited "a knowledgeable source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," which is conducting the talks with Oman, reporting that, over a specific period, Iran will operate the entry of ships through the northern corridor into the Persian Gulf, and Iran and Oman will co-direct their exit through the southern corridor. The source added, "After the specified period, the transit of ships through both northern and southern corridors will stop, and all transits will pass through the middle corridor." He also elaborated on the tolls. "The [toll] received from the vessels will depend on various factors, such as the type and value of the service" provided by Iran and Oman. These services include insurance, refueling, environmental services, and other naval support.

Tasnim News, close with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, published an editorial arguing that the United States cannot militarily restore the previous status quo in the Strait of Hormuz. According to the article, geography allows Iran to create chaos in the sea and, therefore, global markets. "Minesweeping, escorts, and retaliatory effects are not synonymous with returning to normal maritime conditions," as delays, high insurance rates, and low traffic during the brief ceasefire revealed.

On August 5, 2026, the official Islamic Republic News Agency reported that, on the eve of the April 8, 2026 ceasefire, Tehran and Muscat began talking about the future of the Strait. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Sultan Haitham bin Tariq on April 26, 2026, to talk about security concerns. Delegations continued to travel to each other's capitals. The article posed two outcomes for the Iran-Oman agreements: Either "regional and outside (the United States) powers" accept the agreement, leading to stability in the seas, or they

reject it, which will delay the inevitable, until they come to accept the reality of Iranian-Omani sovereignty over the Strait. The article concluded that “Tehran believes that its trust in America has been sacrificed to the White House’s greed,” and therefore it will not rely on the United States to enforce any agreement.

Oman has had warm relations with Iran. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi deployed his military to put down the Dhofar rebellion in 1971, saving Sultan Qaboos, who was only a year into his rule. The 1979 revolution did not shake the relationship. Oman has acted as a mediator between Iran and the United States, hosting secret nuclear talks under the Obama administration in 2012. Oman also has allowed Iran to supply Houthis in Yemen by using Omani territory.

Oman has coastal access to the Strait of Hormuz through Madha, an exclave north of the United Arab Emirates. But the Emirates can make the operation of the Strait difficult for Oman because of geography, if it is willing to take the risk of confronting Iran. Oman is betting its relationship with the region and the United States on Iran’s reliability. This gamble will work only if the rest of the region and the United States continue to allow Oman to sign off to the final agreement. (Middle East Forum Aug 8)

The Threat Israel is Too Tired to See By Aleks Vilentz

The 36th NATO summit opened in Ankara on July 7-8—the first time in 22 years that Turkey hosts the alliance on its own soil. It included 32 leaders and tens of billions of dollars in new defense contracts, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy among the guests and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the host. For a state that runs the harshest anti-Israel rhetoric in the region, this is a moment of peak legitimacy in years.

Israel barely looked. After three years of war, the country is worn out, and the public’s attention is elsewhere: the unfinished settlement in Gaza, the cost of living, internal political division. Turkey has slipped to the periphery. And here, a gap opens that is worth stating plainly: Israeli society sees the Turkish threat—and cannot find the strength to respond to it.

This is not a guess. It’s what two Dor Moriah Center surveys—conducted in May and June, and taken together—actually show.

The mass survey, conducted among 1,007 respondents (the maximum sampling error is $\pm 3.1\%$), leaves no doubt: The Turkish threat has been identified. The most common answer to how Turkey is perceived is “a serious strategic threat,” according to 34.4%. Another 28.5% called it “an unfriendly country.” The share seeing a friend or potential partner in Turkey is negligible: 4.9%.

Turkey’s presence in eastern Jerusalem is rejected almost by consensus. Ankara’s diplomatic activity in the city is rated negatively by 69.9% of Jews; Turkish cultural, educational and religious projects there by 63.5%. This is not the fringe anxiety of activists. It is the settled position of a majority.

So, at the level of diagnosis, Israeli society is not mistaken. It notices who stands in front of it.

What comes next matters more than the diagnosis itself. Recognition of the threat does not turn into a readiness to act.

Ask an Israeli what to do about Turkish activity in eastern Jerusalem, and you’ll not hear a call for a hard response. The most common choice (45.5%) is to permit such activity under limited conditions and strict control. Not to ban it. Not to push it out. To control it. Another 26.0% even allow that it may bring benefit—provided there is Israeli oversight. What dominates is not rebuff but the management of risk.

Ask about Israel’s position in the disputes between Greece and Turkey, and the majority (41.3%) will answer that Israel should stay out of it. Active support for Greece—the natural anti-Turkish move—is favored by only 35.8%.

Ask about the risk of Turkish influence on Israel’s domestic politics, and the “low or no risk” reading prevails: 48% against 37%. A society that calls Turkey a strategic threat sees, at the same time, little risk in its penetration inward. This is not a logical error on the respondents’ part. It is fatigue showing through the numbers: There is simply no resource left for one more source of anxiety.

Even on how Azerbaijan would behave in a conflict with Turkey, what dominates is not calculation but the expectation of neutrality (36.4%)—the posture of an observer, not a player.

Put it together, and the structure of an exhausted society emerges: “I see the threat, I don’t want to open a second front, let me somehow keep it under control but without me.”

Here, the second study enters. In May, Dor Moriah ran an expert survey, “Turkey and Israel’s Geopolitical Environment”—11 specialists, from secular leftists to religious right-wing politicians and analysts. The main result is not any single assessment but the very fact of convergence across the ideological spectrum: What we have is not a partisan interpretation but a structural picture.

The structural picture looks like this. European pressure cannot be relied on: The European Union blocks sanctions against Turkey by consensus of the council, and Athens’s *démarches* yield a declaration, not a result. American pressure is even less so: The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) remains a tool Washington applies at its own discretion and systematically declines to bring to bear against Turkey, while the U.S.-Turkish relationship swings like a pendulum—and that pendulum is a structural vulnerability, not an accident.

The one conclusion shared by experts in every camp: Israel must ensure itself through a deterrence configuration of its own, rather than count on someone else’s pressure on Ankara.

Here, the two studies collide head-on. The experts prescribe self-insurance. The mass survey shows a society that’s not ready for it—not for lack of understanding but for lack of strength. After all, an independent strategic configuration takes political determination, sustained attention and a willingness to bear costs on a second front while the first stays open. All of this is precisely the resource that the Iran war has drained.

The result is a trap. A threat that cannot be handed off to Brussels or Washington arrives at a society with nothing left in reserve for its own answer. Fatigue doesn’t merely dull the reaction; it cuts the power to the one strategy that works.

The experts pointed to a vector Israeli analysis underrates: Turkish secular cultural export, building long-term sympathy among Israel’s Arab citizens. And not by tanks and missiles, but by television, educational programs and a humanitarian presence, soft and patient.

This is not a hypothesis hanging in the air. The mass survey measures it. In the Arab sector, the index of perception of Turkey is positive (+29.7); a favorable assessment prevails. In the Jewish sector, it is deeply negative (−49.5), with the perception of threat dominant. Arab respondents rate Turkish activity in eastern Jerusalem positively, and only 9.3% favor strict control over it, against 52.4% among Jews. The process the experts warn about is already under way—and already visible in the data.

Working against such a vector calls not for a forceful answer but for a long, painstaking presence of the state in its own rear: an alternative, transparent, non-religious infrastructure in place of the Turkish one. This is the most resource-intensive of all strategies—and the least compatible with exhaustion. A prohibitive gesture is even harmful here: It hands Turkey, as the experts note, the image of a “blocked benefactor.” And for a patient alternative, a worn-out society has neither the attention, nor the money, nor the political mandate.

The experts’ consensus forecast through 2030 is “managed hostility”: cold functionalism, diplomatic relations kept to a minimum and demonstrative confrontation alongside the real avoidance of a rupture.

It is a scenario in which nothing blows up, but nothing gets resolved either. It is precisely this scenario that lulls. It lets society postpone the answer because catastrophe does not arrive tomorrow.

The problem is that “managed hostility” is not a pause but a process. While Israel rests, the Turkish presence in eastern Jerusalem accumulates; sympathy in the Arab sector grows; and the Western alliance seen at the summit in Ankara arms and legitimizes Ankara. Not one of these processes waits for Israeli society to recover its strength. (JNS Aug 11)

Why the Anti-Israel Left Keeps Siding with Authoritarian Regimes

By Tirza Shorr

Mirah Wood, a member of the Democratic Socialists of America's International Committee, recently described the image that moved her on Oct. 7, 2023: Palestinian fighters "in their little slippers" approaching Israeli tanks. In a recording circulated by Canary Mission, she called the attack a shot into "the heart of empire itself."

Wood serves on the same committee whose members were reportedly flown to China as VIP guests, instructed to avoid subjects considered sensitive by Beijing, and asked to pledge that they will "support, defend and build understanding of Chinese socialism." Such celebration of Oct. 7 and the committee's enthusiasm for Beijing follow the same ideological logic. That logic is known as "campism."

Campism divides world politics into two rival camps: The first is an "imperialist" bloc led by the United States. The second is an "anti-imperialist" bloc comprised of governments and movements that resist Washington. Political loyalty flows automatically toward the second camp, regardless of how its members govern or what they do to their own populations.

The term emerged during the Cold War to describe leftists whose loyalty to the Soviet Union survived Moscow's violent suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956. The related label "tankies" grew out of the same episode. Campism turned allegiance to a geopolitical camp into a test of political virtue. A state that opposed the United States occupied the correct side of history by definition.

Campism's intellectual roots reach back to Lenin's theory of imperialism. In that tradition, capitalism survives by expanding abroad, exploiting foreign labor and capturing new markets. American military power and defense spending are therefore interpreted primarily as instruments of conquest. Later theories of dependency added a global "core" that extracts wealth from a permanent "periphery," aided by Western institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Once applied to foreign policy, this framework grants moral credit to any government that resists the Western "core." Socialist, authoritarian and theocratic regimes can all qualify. The nature of a government matters less than its position in the global struggle. Opposition to Washington serves as evidence of legitimacy, while alliances with the United States serve as evidence of complicity.

The Palestinians became the flagship cause of this worldview during the 20th century.

At the 1955 Bandung Conference, 29 Asian and African states united around the idea of a Third World that sought solidarity outside the Western order. Israel was excluded, despite being led at the time by left-wing Labor Zionists, because of its alignment with the United States. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser placed Palestine on the conference agenda, and Ahmad al-Shuqairi, who later became the founding chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, represented the Palestinians.

Bandung's final communiqué endorsed the rights of the "Arab people of Palestine." Its deeper impact came from the ideological framework it helped establish. Jewish self-determination, rooted in thousands of years of continuous connection to the land, was recast as European colonialism transplanted onto Asian soil. Israel came to represent the entire relationship between the Western "core" and the colonized "periphery."

Mao Zedong made the geopolitical meaning explicit.

In March 1965, Mao told the first PLO delegation to visit Beijing that Israel and Taiwan were "bases of imperialism in Asia." He described the Arab campaign against Israel as part of the broader battle against the West. Israel's destruction, according to this theory, would weaken the Western order itself.

Beijing backed this doctrine with material support. China became the first non-Arab power to recognize the PLO in 1965. It supplied Palestinian organizations, including Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine with weapons, military aid and guerrilla training.

Maoist doctrine also entered Palestinian training camps. An Arabic edition of Mao's Little Red Book appeared after the 1967 Six-Day War, as Palestinian militants turned away from the failed model of

conventional Arab armies and toward the Maoist concept of "people's war." The book became part of the curriculum in camps operated by rival Palestinian factions in Jordan and Lebanon. George Habash, founder of the Marxist-Leninist PFLP, called China "our best friend." Nayef Hawatmeh's faction embraced Maoism so thoroughly that opponents nicknamed him "Nayef Zedong."

Camp membership determines which victims command attention and which abuses receive excuses.

The ideological line from Bandung and Beijing reaches into American politics today.

The DSA's China Working Group promotes the goal of a "multipolar world," language also used by Kremlin ideologists and Tehran. DSA platforms have called for American withdrawal from NATO, the dismantling of security treaties with Japan and South Korea, and sharp reductions in U.S. defense spending.

Campism presents American alliances as extensions of imperial control. It leaves little room for confronting expansion by Russia, China or Iran, since those states have already been assigned the anti-imperialist role. Their domestic repression and regional ambitions become secondary to their opposition to the United States.

The consequences of this approach extend far beyond political rhetoric.

Roughly one-fifth of the world's oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. American naval power helps keep that waterway open, and the global economy depends on the credibility of that presence. A diminished American role would give greater leverage to whichever regional power controls the chokepoint. Energy prices, commercial shipping and the security of dependent economies would become more vulnerable to coercion.

The governments and movements treated by campists as natural allies against the American-led order offer their own model of power: mass surveillance in Xinjiang, executions in Tehran, Russian expansionism and attacks on Red Sea shipping by the Houthis. Hamas belongs to the same ideological camp because it fights Israel, and its conduct is judged accordingly.

Within this framework, the Oct. 7 massacre in southern Israel can be romanticized as a blow against empire. Palestinian fighters become symbols of resistance. Israeli civilians and the character of the attack recede from view. The same framework allows reports of forced labor in China to be dismissed as hostile "scandal stories." Camp membership determines which victims command attention and which abuses receive excuses.

The DSA has grown into the largest socialist organization in the United States. Its members and activists helped elect New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani and support candidates across the country. Ideas once associated with Cold War factions now have a growing presence in American electoral politics and influential parts of the Democratic coalition.

Campism offers a simple moral map of the world. America and its allies occupy the imperialist camp. Their enemies occupy the camp of liberation. Every conflict is interpreted through that division.

Israel holds a central place in this doctrine because it is portrayed as the West's forward garrison in the Middle East. The hostility directed at Israel therefore reaches beyond disputes over borders, settlements or government policy. Israel's existence within the Western alliance becomes the offense.

This helps explain why parts of the radical left can celebrate violence against Israelis, defend the Chinese Communist Party and promote the weakening of American alliances without sensing a contradiction. Each position serves the same political vision. China, Russia, Iran, Hamas and the Houthis all challenge an American-led order. Israel stands at its front line.

A doctrine that grants legitimacy according to geopolitical allegiance will repeatedly excuse repression, aggression and terrorism committed by the favored camp. Israel remains its most visible target. The consequences extend to every society that depends on open sea lanes, credible alliances and resistance to authoritarian expansion.

(JNS Aug 11)