



ISRAEL NEWS

*A collection of the week's news from Israel
From the Bet El Twinning / Israel Action Committee of
Beth Avraham Yoseph of Toronto Congregation*

getting paid and their imaginary supreme leader is nowhere to be found. Public anger may soon boil over to the level witnessed in January.

Hopefully President Trump is busy planning for how to

covertly help the Iranian people as their next window of opportunity to seize control rapidly approaches.

Meanwhile, just as the pressure builds on Tehran, the IRGC's counterpressure on the United States is slowly dissipating.

The US military continues to move more and more oil out of the Strait of Hormuz every week. Senior officials say 16 million barrels of oil came out on Friday night, while Energy Secretary Chris Wright reported 15 million barrels came out in a single night last week.

The three steps needed to crush the IRGC remain the same today as they were nearly four months ago: enforce the blockade alongside total economic warfare; use the U.S. military to get more oil out of Hormuz; and employ American energy dominance to eliminate the IRGC's leverage forever. President Trump is following this formula to great effect. (NY Post Aug 24)

Commentary...

Operation Economic Outcast is a Recipe for Success Against Iran

By Richard Goldberg

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on Monday launched what he called Operation Economic Outcast — a global campaign to shut down every last source of financial oxygen feeding a fractured rump regime in Tehran that's already circling the economic drain.

Combined with the US military's growing success in covertly moving oil out of the Strait of Hormuz, President Trump will edge one step closer to checkmate against Iran's Revolutionary Guard when he gives the green light to drop the hammer on nations that ignore America's final warning.

The United States can't force other countries to join a bombing run. It can't compel foreign navies to patrol the Persian Gulf. But it can change economic behavior through the threat and imposition of US secondary sanctions — on private banks, brokers and exchanges, airport authorities and aviation service providers, shippers and insurers, and even state-owned enterprises and government instrumentalities.

The threat of secondary sanctions can shut down trade across land borders and keep airplanes grounded. It can also disrupt the movement of cash, cryptocurrency, goods and services.

Pulling the trigger on these sanctions can be disruptive. It can break a diplomatic relationship, crash a foreign country's economy or cause temporary knock-on effects in the global economy.

We saw examples during the first Trump administration, from tanking the Turkish lira to free an American Christian pastor to shaking up global shipping to force China's COSCO to stop carrying Iranian cargo.

It takes courage for a president to authorize this kind of total financial warfare. But that's exactly what appears to be happening with a Treasury Secretary empowered to do whatever it takes to bring down Iran's financial house of cards.

That's very bad news for the IRGC. Every escape hatch from the naval blockade is about to close. From its immediate neighbors to its sanctions evasion hubs across the Gulf, Europe and China, to its one-off schemes in Africa and the Western Hemisphere, the Treasury Department has mapped out every source of remaining oxygen breathing financial life into the regime in Tehran.

American diplomats and Treasury attaches abroad are meeting with their counterparts this week to tell them what steps are necessary — and put them on the clock to either asphyxiate the IRGC or face asphyxiation from U.S. sanctions.

Secretary Bessent gave us some hints of where Treasury will focus its enforcement efforts: Iranian bank branches still operating abroad, digital assets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping.

But the broader the financial message was clear: If it looks like Iran, if it smells like Iran, or if it talks like Iran, shut it down now, or Treasury will shut you down by the end of the week.

Last week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said it would be better for the IRGC to "bring the war to an end now." His comments followed Iran's central bank governor warning about severe economic impacts.

The National Iranian Oil Company's bank accounts were recently frozen due to unpaid debts. Inflation tops 100% and news of Operation Economic Outcast further collapsed Iran's currency, which now trades at 2 million Rial to the dollar.

Gasoline shortages are increasing, the IRGC's loyal soldiers aren't

The War on a String By Seth Mandel

Toys play a strange role in the Mideast information wars. Palestinian and Iranian terrorist groups risibly accuse Israel of rigging all manner of children's toys to explode on contact. The groups, which expect the foreign media to swallow such nonsense hook, line, and sinker, then turn around and organize the floating of balloons with incendiary material into Israel to start wildfires.

Those balloons were weapons. But Israel's enemies have graduated: Now they're flying kites that aren't weapons at all but are considerably more dangerous.

It sounds silly, and Hamas and Hezbollah want you to think it's silly. And they want newspapers to run with headlines about IDF overreaction to children flying kites. But in order to believe that's all this is, one has to practice a high degree of naivete or bias or both. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to be as clear as he could be: "We have been working for several years on a solution to the drone threat. We are the most advanced in the world, but this is a global problem," he said in a video message. The Times of Israel notes that Netanyahu specifically name-dropped Ukraine and Lebanon as previous staging grounds for this particular problem, adding: "and now they are trying to renew this threat and bring it into Gaza."

Drones? What do drones have to do with kites? Everything. The latest drone threat is the use of unmanned vehicles attached to fiber optic cables. As I wrote last month, such drones have been causing the bulk of this summer's casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Moscow initially used cheap Iranian-made drones to force Kyiv to drain its coffers by using interceptors that are much more expensive than the targets they are shooting down. Ukraine adapted, coming up with cheaper interceptors. Russia adapted too, by flying drones in swarming formations. Ukraine tried to jam the radio frequencies used by the drones. So Russia started large-scale manufacture of fiber optic drones. These leashed drones can't fly as far, because they are tethered to their driver. But they can't be jammed either, because they communicate through the cable.

What does this have to do with Israel? In early June, the New York Times reported: "An explosive drone snaked between the hills of southern Lebanon before striking an Israeli armored personnel carrier. Two days later, another slammed into a tank. Three days after that, a third pounded into a missile-defense system.

"Each day, multiple drones attack Israeli forces, the Israeli military has said, and with lethal effect. In the past week alone, they have killed three soldiers.

“The relentless drone attacks by Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Lebanese militant group, have exposed cracks in Israel’s defenses, shocking its public and forcing a rushed search for solutions by its military and political leaderships.”

Hezbollah had begun using fiber optic drones, to deadly effect.

At the moment, Israel is trying to keep Hezbollah’s forces from getting too close to the border. Distance is the best defense against tethered drones for now.

But distance isn’t an option in Gaza. Hamas and other terrorist operatives in the Gaza Strip will be attempting to adopt the new drone strategy; in such close proximity, the leashes will be less of a drawback.

That’s where the kites come in. And it also explains not only Israel’s response but Netanyahu’s openness about the response.

The lesson of October 7 was that everything Hamas does is to test Israel’s defenses. Inaction, too, is a test. Netanyahu doesn’t need to tell the Israeli public that the kite-flying is related to drone warfare; they know exactly what Hamas is up to. Rather, Bibi wants the public to see him acknowledge the threat as evidence that he has learned from the failures of October 7. His comments are directed primarily not at Hamas but at the voting public, who he hopes will believe he’s learned enough of those lessons to give him another term. (Commentary.org Aug 24)

The Red-Green Alliance: From the Hebron Massacre to Oct. 7

By Shimon Refaeli

Ninety-seven years ago, on Aug. 24, 1929, armed Arabs carrying knives, axes and iron bars broke into Jewish homes in Hebron. Within two hours, 66 Jews were slaughtered, the vast majority of them defenseless.

Two- and 3-year-old children, young girls and yeshivah students endured unimaginable horrors: Heads were severed, throats were slit, women were raped in front of their family members, eyes were gouged out, and hands were chopped off. Ben-Zion Gershon, a pharmacist who had devotedly treated Arab residents for decades and saved hundreds of them, was brutally tortured before being murdered, along with his family members. At the Slonim house, 22 souls were massacred, and infants like 1-year-old Shlomo and 2-year-old Menachem Segal met their deaths with horrifying cruelty that can still be read about online.

The incitement came directly from Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who spread lies about Jewish “theft” of the Western Wall, and then incited the masses with cries of Allahu Akbar! (“God is great!” in Arabic) and “Slaughter the Jews!” The Mufti built his power through extremist religious education systems and the dissemination of deep-rooted hatred of Jews—the exact same hatred that Hamas adopted into its 1988 charter.

However, the central historical dimension that reveals itself time and again is not limited solely to religious-Muslim nationalism, but includes a partnership from the radical left.

As early as 1929, the Marxists celebrated the slaughter of Jews. The Yiddish-language Communist Party newspaper *Morning Freiheit* in New York published cartoons condemning the Jews who defended themselves. The Soviet Comintern called for the establishment of a “Soviet Sovietistan” and supported the pogroms out of a revolutionary mindset that echoes to this day: “In a country like Palestine, a revolutionary movement without pogroms is impossible,” communists wrote.

These ideological roots date back even earlier, appearing *inter alia* in Karl Marx’s writings (*On the Jewish Question*), in which he equated Judaism with capital and usury; saw the liberation of the world as liberation from Judaism; and supported the Ottoman jihad against Russia in the hope of igniting a regional revolution.

Nearly a century has passed since the events of Hebron, but the red-green alliance has not vanished; it has merely taken on a new form, strengthening within the public, academic and political sphere in

the West, and all the more so since the massacre in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. The moment the scale of the slaughter, rape and kidnapping committed by Hamas in the border communities became clear, one would have expected a wall-to-wall universal condemnation.

Instead, we witnessed an astonishing and alarming phenomenon: Vast segments of the progressive and socialist left at leading universities in the West rushed to justify, whitewash and even celebrate the acts of atrocity.

The crowds that filled the streets of New York, London and Berlin under the slogans “From the river to the sea” were not merely protesting the policies of the Israeli government; they replicated that same historical pattern of behavior in which violence against Jews is justified as an “anti-colonial struggle” or as part of a “global revolution.” Modern socialist organizations adopted the narrative of Islamic jihad, replacing religious language with the terminology of “social justice” and “resistance to oppression.”

Thus, murderous terrorists were transformed into “freedom fighters” and innocent massacre victims into representatives of “colonialism.”

Organized antisemitism in the West today presents a perfect symbiosis: Radical socialism provides the theoretical framework and public legitimacy on campuses and in parliaments, while extreme Islamism provides the execution and fanatical religious motivation. From the Mufti al-Husseini to the progressive student cells of the 21st century, the goal remains the same: the demonization of Israel and the undermining of the Jewish people’s very right to live in security in their homeland.

History teaches us that when the radical left allies with jihad, the target and the victim have always been and remain the Jews. Today, more than ever, it is our duty to identify this alliance and fight it without compromise. (JNS Aug 24)

The Empty Runway By Gregg Roman

At dawn on Tuesday, Israeli aircraft put eight strikes into the runway and storage sheds of Abu al-Duhur, a mothballed Syrian airbase in Idlib about 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. Nobody died. The base has not operated as a working military airfield in over a decade. That is the point: Israel was not bombing an army. It was bombing a possibility.

The possibility had visited the day before. Syrian officials told the Associated Press that a Turkish delegation had toured the base on Monday to review rehabilitation work and left hours before the bombs arrived, the first confirmed Turkish presence at the site. Jerusalem confirmed the strike and said Syria was on the verge of breaching an agreed security status quo by letting Turkish troops deploy there. Ankara denied any delegation was at the base before or during the strike, called the raid a violation of Syrian sovereignty, and accused Israel of expansionist politics timed to an election. Damascus said the Turkish visits were ordinary military contact and that no Turkish base is planned. Carry all of it; the gap between those tellings is exactly where wars are born.

Then the American in the middle started talking. Tom Barrack, Washington’s ambassador to Turkey and its envoy for Syria, called the strike an unnecessary escalation and said Turkey had not been warned: Turkish forces watched Israeli aircraft heading north toward their own border and “could have reasonably prepared” a military response. To the *Jerusalem Post* he went further: the strike carried a real risk of rapid escalation into a direct military confrontation, because Turkish commanders, unaware of the target or the intent, could have scrambled jets in the belief that Turkey itself was under attack. To i24 he compressed it into one sentence: the two countries were a step away from shooting. Those three sentences are reporting, they have held up, and the file below uses them.

The rest of what the envoy said that week is a different matter. By Friday he was telling an interviewer that Israel “occupies” the

Golan Heights “against the UN resolutions, against all of the international order,” which does not needle Jerusalem so much as repeal, from an embassy in Ankara, the proclamation his own president signed in 2019 recognizing Israeli sovereignty there, still the standing policy of the United States. He floated the theory that Israel “simply tried to bait Turkey” into a response that “might play well going into elections,” and he said a Lebanon settlement must run through Iran and Hezbollah. The pushback came from two directions at once. From Jerusalem, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar called the comments “full of inaccuracies,” with positions that “contradict the position of Trump himself.” And from the president’s own political camp: Laura Loomer, who has Trump’s ear, demanded the envoy’s resignation and wrote of him, “He always sides with the bad guys”; a Republican senator had already told Jewish Insider that he is “running a Turkish line”; and the New York Sun asked in print whether America’s ambassador is too close to Turkey. The president, notably, never echoed his envoy’s condemnation of the strike. The envoy’s brief, keeping two American allies from shooting, is real work, and this file borrows his facts where they check out. But an ambassador improvising his own foreign policy between two air forces a step apart is not a sideshow; he is a risk all his own. When Washington speaks in two voices, Ankara believes the one it likes, Jerusalem discounts both, and the American brake fails exactly when the next misunderstanding needs it.

The rest of the week supplied the soundtrack. On Friday Turkey asked Interpol for a red notice against the Israeli prime minister over the flotilla case; Netanyahu’s office answered that the “pathetic attempt to intimidate the leaders and soldiers of Israel” would go nowhere and called Erdoğan an “antisemitic dictator”; the Likud campaign had already put Erdoğan on billboards. These are two states with no ambassadors since November 2024 and no trade since May 2024, now separated from a shooting war by the reaction time of a Turkish radar crew on a night nobody called ahead.

So take the question seriously, precisely in order to refuse it. Three things need answering in one place: what a Turkey-Israel war would actually look like, why Israel must not fight it, and how Israel contains Turkey’s army in Syria anyway. The Forum was asking the first question before it was fashionable; this is the answer file.

What the War Would Look Like

Start by clearing the movie versions off the table. There is no Turkish armor driving to Tel Aviv, no Israeli occupation of Anatolia, and no amphibious landing at Israel’s narrow waist; that last one is a question a Forum colleague once posed to force Washington to plan, not a scenario for adults to write. There is also no Trafalgar: Turkey has the bigger surface fleet and a habit of maritime assertion, Israel’s navy is built around its gas platforms, and this week Israeli security officials described the friction at sea to ynet as displays of presence and projection, not combat. The war would not look like any war these two publics imagine.

It would look like the last sixteen months in Syria, with one addition: people in the blast radius who answer to Ankara. The real war is already visible in rehearsal. Israel strikes runways, hangars, and radar sites associated with a possible Turkish footprint, as it did at T4, Palmyra, and Hama in 2025 and at Abu al-Duhur on Tuesday, on the theory that concrete can be bombed before soldiers arrive without starting anything. An opinion essay in Israel Hayom said the quiet part in print this week: before Turkish troops arrive, the target is infrastructure, because afterward every strike risks Turkish dead. That is one writer’s argument, not doctrine, but it describes the visible pattern.

Both sides have a theory of the case, and the theories are mirror images. Jerusalem’s: if Turkish radar and air defense take up residence in Syria, Israel loses the corridor its air force used against Iran, and a hostile state’s sensors sit on the flight path of every future mission; the red line, consistently stated, was never Turkish infantry, it is equipment that can see the Israeli air force. Ankara’s: Israel has run 988 air and artillery strikes in Syria in the seven months after Assad

fell, against 334 in the previous seven years, and if every airfield Turkey surveys gets cratered, the Syrian army Turkey has contracted to rebuild can never stand up. Both theories are locally rational. Run together without a referee, they produce exactly the Tuesday just survived.

From there the fighting writes itself, and none of it is 1973. Standoff strikes against infrastructure, answered by Turkish air defense and electronic warfare from inside Syria. Drones against drones before any manned aircraft meet, because a manned engagement is the conversion event both general staffs fear; the memory in the room is the Russian Su-24 a Turkish F-16 dropped in 2015, the last time an unannounced military aircraft crossed the wrong line near this border. Naval shadowing around Cyprus and the gas fields as a supporting theater, where the first casualty is the insurance premium on Leviathan. The always-on layer, flotillas, Interpol filings, mosque rhetoric, billboards, doing its work of removing off-ramps. And over it all, the mechanism Barrack described: no hotline call, a radar picture filling with unexplained jets, and a scramble order that turns a clash into a war in ninety seconds.

The conversion rule is worth stating plainly, because it is the entire strategic problem. A clash is Abu al-Duhur: hours long, deniable, survivable, nobody dead. A war is any of the same events plus one body: a Turkish soldier under Israeli munitions, or an Israeli crew fired on by a battery that was never told the package was heading north. Neither government has decided to cross that line. The danger is that nobody has to decide; the misread decides for them.

The War Israel Cannot Afford

Now the second question, and the answer the Forum owes its readers without varnish: this is a war Israel must refuse, and not out of sentiment about a former ally.

Begin with the arsenal. Israel is in month six of a two-front missile war, and this newsletter’s own reporting has tracked the magazine problem since spring: Arrow interceptors are the acknowledged bottleneck, American Patriot and THAAD stocks are the coalition’s constraint, and the Houthis are still shooting. A second state-level air war is not a second front; it is a withdrawal from the first one, priced in interceptors Israel does not have to spare. Israel’s own defense establishment has said the quiet version in doctrine: the INSS annual assessment files Turkey as a threat to monitor, not a reference threat to build force against, and Israeli security officials repeated the point to ynet this week: fighting Turkey is not part of the reference scenario, Turkey is a rival state and not an enemy state, and the spectrum between those words is delicate.

Then the alliance. Turkey is inside NATO; Israel is America’s closest non-NATO ally; a war between them is a machine for breaking American strategy in the region, which is why it would freeze Washington rather than enlist it. The legal essays circulating in Israel this week arguing that Article 5 does not travel with Turkish uniforms into Syria may or may not be right as treaty reading, but they are an opinion page, not a targeting authority, and they miss the operational point: Incirlik and the Kürecik radar sit on sovereign Turkish soil, inside the American war architecture, and any war that puts them in question is an American crisis. Washington’s president has spent this year transacting warmly with both capitals, from the Ankara summit in July onward, whatever his envoy improvises; the F-35 file is stalled by statute, not by Israeli lobbying, and the State Department told Congress in writing in July that Turkey has not yet met the legal conditions. Israel does not need to bomb a runway to win an argument Congress has already frozen.

Then the clock. Turkey’s rearmament is real and unfinished: the Steel Dome air-defense network is talked about for 2030, the Eurofighters have not arrived, the Kaan fighter is a development program and not a fleet, and when Iranian missiles crossed Turkish airspace in March it was NATO assets that intercepted them. Some in Jerusalem will read that as an argument to fight now, while the gap is widest. That is the most dangerous sentence in this file. Fighting a

NATO member to preempt a hypothetical is how a manageable rivalry becomes a generational enmity; it would hand Tehran, in its sixth month of losing, the only gift that could rescue its war, a second front wearing an alliance flag. And Ankara keeps saying, on the record, that it is not seeking the fight: the foreign minister told an interviewer this month there is no reason for open conflict, while accusing Israel's prime minister of needing an election villain. Discount the motive, bank the statement.

Last, the test this newsletter set out this morning. The Ben-Gurion Standard asks one thing of a war: name the end state, then pay for it. A Turkey war has no nameable end state. Airpower cannot disarm an eighty-five-million-person NATO state; nobody in Jerusalem proposes regime change in Ankara; and every sortie flown at Turkey is flown away from the war Israel actually has to finish. A war that cannot say what it converts into fails the standard at the first question. Refusing it is not hesitation. It is the decision.

Containment Without Collision

Refusing the war is not the same as conceding Syria, and this is where the essay earns its keep, because Israel's necessary policy runs on two tracks that look contradictory and are not: no war with Turkey, and no Turkish army parked where it can blind Israel. The instrument set exists. It needs to be named, staffed, and used.

First, draw the line where the interest actually is, and write it down. Israel's problem was never Turkish trainers teaching Syrian conscripts to march, and the record shows Jerusalem has lived with Turkish ground presence in the north; the problem is sensors and interceptors that can watch and close Syrian airspace. Call it the Radar Line: Turkish men and trucks north of an agreed geography are livable; Turkish radar and air defense that can see the Israeli air force, anywhere in Syria, are not. A rule that precise can be codified with Damascus and Washington, and a codified rule is the difference between a site visit and a provocation. The Nagel Commission warned in January 2025 that a Syria turned Turkish protectorate risks direct confrontation; the answer to that warning is a line that keeps the protectorate unbuilt without requiring a war. And the warning is current, not archival: a source familiar with the matter confirmed to the Jerusalem Post this weekend that Turkey is seeking to put radar at Syrian bases now and, in time, air defense crewed by Turkish soldiers. The Radar Line is not a hypothetical boundary; it is the next six months.

Second, put the price of crossing the line somewhere other than a runway. Israel's real leverage against Ankara is not another sortie; it is Turkey's exposure abroad. The European Union is Turkey's largest trading partner, the defense industry Erdoğan showcases grows on European and American contracts and components, the accession file in Brussels has been frozen since 2018, and the F-35 waits on legal conditions Congress has seen no reason to soften. Jerusalem should spend its diplomatic and intelligence capital making that exposure conditional, in coalition and in daylight: export-license reviews in European capitals when Turkish systems move toward Syria; customs-union modernization priced openly against conduct; a patient intelligence effort that exposes what Turkish services and their proxies do on European soil, where several governments have already moved against Ankara's networks; and in Washington, existing law kept exactly as written. Economic pressure, intelligence pressure, political pressure on Turkish interests from Brussels to the Gulf: that is escalation Israel can afford, priced in money, licenses, and standing, and it answers Ankara in currencies that cannot shoot back.

Third, make the channel that already exists impossible to ignore. Israel and Turkey have run a deconfliction hotline since April 2025, born of the Baku rounds Azerbaijan quietly hosted after the T4 strikes, and a hotline that is not used before a strike near the Turkish border is a hotline that does not exist. So upgrade it from a phone number to a standing watch: staffed around the clock, in Hebrew, Arabic, English, and Turkish, with two written rules that pay for themselves. An Israeli package flying north of a published line generates a call, every time. A Turkish air-defense lock generates a call, every time. The purpose is to

make Tuesday's sentence, "heading north, and nobody called," impossible to write again. And Baku's unique value, family to Ankara, trusted in Jerusalem, must not be spent on a war; it should keep hosting the technical track no matter how loud the podiums get.

Fourth, close the Damascus file before the Israeli election does it for everyone. The Mossad chief and Syria's foreign minister spoke by phone on August 14; al-Sharaa's government keeps signaling it prefers de-escalation and wants a security agreement; and Turkey itself has encouraged Damascus toward exactly such a mechanism, because Ankara's stakes sit in the north, not on the Golan. A signed Israel-Syria security text, with the Radar Line inside it, is the single instrument that keeps Turkish trainers from ever becoming Turkish bases. Take yes for an answer before October 27 turns every file into a campaign prop.

Fifth, keep the Hamas office in Istanbul a mediation file, not a targeting file. The reporting that Hamas has been moving covert planning and cyber work from Doha to Turkey, while Turkish intelligence hosts its leadership for Gaza mediation, is the one thread in this story that could bypass Syria entirely. Washington's ask of Ankara should be surgical: mediation stays, covert operations leave. And Jerusalem's discipline must be absolute: no strike on Turkish soil, whatever the file says, because a Doha repeat in a NATO capital is the clash no channel can contain. The lever is the mediation chain itself; use it.

Sixth, leave the Mecca pact where this newsletter already put it: a Gulf document, a Saudi hedge with Turkish photography, not an Israel-Turkey treaty. The tripwires I listed two weeks ago still have not tripped. The fastest way to make the photograph grow teeth is to campaign against it.

And two lists of restraint, one per capital, offered with the same respect. Jerusalem should not crater a base the same week it prints the adversary on a billboard; should not let legal essays about Article 5 read like targeting memos; and should not run against Turkey as the new Iran while the actual Iran war is unfinished. Ankara should not put air defense where it can see the Israeli air force; should not launch its long-threatened move on the Syrian Kurds during an Israeli election, with its own red lines primed; and should not mistake Interpol theater for law while its intelligence service hosts the men Israel holds responsible for October 7. Neither list requires either government to like the other. Containment never does.

The Discipline

Here is the paradox that makes refusal easy to sell in Jerusalem, or should: Israel is winning the Syria file without a war. Three Turkish base plans were shelved after Israeli strikes on empty concrete. The strike rate that Ankara protests, 988 in seven months, is itself the proof of escalation dominance; Turkey has answered none of it with force. The corridor to Iran stays open, the radar stays unbuilt, and the price so far has been paid in runway asphalt rather than in anyone's sons. That is what winning a containment looks like, and it is why converting it into a shooting war would be the first genuinely losing move available to Israel on this front.

The discipline this file asks of Israel is the same one it asked of the candidates this morning, applied to a different door. The Ben-Gurion Standard says choose war or peace and pay the price. Turkey is the rare file where statesmanship's answer is the third thing: contain, in daylight, with instruments, so that the choice never has to be made at all, least of all by a radar crew at three in the morning. Keep the line codified, the price non-kinetic, the watch staffed, the phone answered before the aircraft launch, and the Hamas file in the mediation channel.

The empty runway at Abu al-Duhur is the whole doctrine in one image. Empty is the win condition. An empty runway means the radar never arrived, the call was made, the deterrent held, and no one on either side flew into a misread. Israel's job between now and October 27 is to keep it exactly that: cratered if necessary, empty always, and never, ever occupied by the war that would fill it. (Middle East Forum Aug 23)